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Abstract
Counterfeiting is a signiﬁcant public policy issue, because paper money, despite rumours of its
demise, remains an important part of our payments system. Various parties have a stake in the
prevention of counterfeiting. For individuals and businesses, the share of counterfeits in
outstanding currency indicates the likelihood that the next bill they receive will be counterfeit. For
government, it indicates the extent to which the circulation of counterfeits displaces legitimate
currencyandreducesitsseignioragebeneﬁtfromtherighttoissuecurrency.Mostsigniﬁcantlyfor
monetary authorities, it indicates the degree to which counterfeiting challenges the integrity of the
nation’s currency. The author considers the economic issues that counterfeiting raises. He
proposes an innovative method for estimating the quantity of counterfeit currency in circulation
and develops estimates for Canada for 2001. Such a measure can make a signiﬁcant contribution
to public policy by providing a basis, through international comparisons, for assessing the
effectiveness of different currency features in combatting counterfeiting.
JEL classiﬁcation: E5, E58
Bank classiﬁcation: Bank notes
Résumé
La contrefaçon constitue un problème majeur pour les pouvoirs publics parce que, en dépit des
bruits courant sur sa disparition éventuelle, le papier-monnaie demeure une composante
importante de notre système de paiement. Un grand nombre d’agents économiques ont intérêt à ce
que l’on fasse échec à la contrefaçon. Pour les particuliers et les entreprises, la proportion de faux
par rapport à l’ensemble des billets en circulation indique la probabilité que le prochain billet reçu
soit un faux. Pour le gouvernement, elle reflète la mesure dans laquelle les faux billets se
substituent aux billets authentiques et réduisent les revenus de seigneuriage découlant du
privilège d’émission. Fait particulièrement important pour les autorités monétaires, cette
proportion donne une idée de la mesure dans laquelle la contrefaçon remet en cause l’intégrité de
la monnaie nationale. L’auteur examine les problèmes économiques que soulève la contrefaçon. Il
propose une nouvelle méthode d’estimation de la quantité de faux billets en circulation et présente
des estimations du degré de contrefaçon au Canada en 2001. Du fait qu’elle permet d’effectuer
des comparaisons internationales pour juger de l’efficacité des éléments de sécurité intégrés aux
billets de banque, cette mesure peut apporter une contribution appréciable à la politique des
pouvoirs publics en matière de lutte à la contrefaçon.
Classiﬁcation JEL: E5, E58
Classiﬁcation de la Banque: Billets de banqueGoal: To create a currency that the government can produce in
the billions and no one else can produce once.
T.A. Ferguson
Director
U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing
June 20021
1. Introduction
Even though it is not the most lurid of crimes, counterfeiting seems to fascinate the public
and the press. The media have recently focused attention on reports of counterfeiting
activity in Canada. Surprisingly, economists have shown little interest in studying the
issue.1
Counterfeiting is a signiﬁcant public policy issue because paper money, despite rumours
of its demise, is still an important part of our payments system. Table 1 shows that almost
$36 billion in notes was outstanding on average during 2001. Over 50 per cent of these
notes consisted of $20 bills (excluding $1, $2, and $1,000 notes), with the remainder
spread fairly evenly among the other denominations. Canadian individuals and businesses
held almost 1 billion notes (excluding  $1, $2, and $1,000 notes), or approximately 32
notes per person. These holdings represented over $1,053 in notes per capita, of which
over 49 per cent consisted of $100 notes.
The role of currency in total payments is difﬁcult to estimate because of the lack of infor-
mation about the value of payments made using currency. Bank credit cards and debit
cards may appear to be taking over the traditional role of currency in small payments.
Despite the rapid growth of these payment technologies, Canada’s $36 billion of circulat-
ing paper currency needs to turn over just six times per year to carry out the
$216 billion worth of transactions performed in 2001 with credit and debit cards com-
bined.2
Several  parties have a stake in the prevention of counterfeiting. The public, especially
those handling currency payments, want to know their chances of receiving a bogus bill in
any transaction. Central banks, as currency issuers, want to know the degree to which their
currency has been corrupted by counterfeits. Counterfeits represent a ﬁnancial loss to
1. A search of Econlit (an index of published papers in economics) using the word “counter-
feit,” turned up many references to the counterfeiting of luxury brand goods. The use of
“counterfeit” and “currency” yielded only three academic references.
2. All these payment methods—currency, credit cards, and debit cards— were dwarfed by the
cheque payments system in 2001. Some 1.3 billion cheque transactions with a value of
$4,265 billion were cleared through the Canadian Payments Association.2
issuers of currency, and a sufﬁcient level of counterfeits in  circulation may jeopardize
public acceptability of a currency issue.
A substantial loss of conﬁdence in domestic currency may cause the public to turn to sub-
stitutes, a transition that could create a high level of uncertainty for individuals and busi-
nesses. Indeed, in times of war, the disruptive costs of such a drop in conﬁdence can be
used as a weapon. This was recognized by Galeazzo Sforza, a Milanese duke in the ﬁf-
teenth  century, in his efforts against enemies in the rival city-state of Venice and by the
United States in the Vietnam War. Both attempted to sabotage their foes’ economies by
destabilizing their currencies through the wholesale introduction of counterfeit currency
(Altig 2002). Indeed, the costs of the Nazi attempt to destabilize the British pound in
World War II have been described as follows: “while less obviously violent than Lufft-
waffe bombs. . . recognized as no less virulent” with an objective “to undermine the public
conﬁdence in the pound and, by so doing, irreparably damage the British economy” (Altig
2002, 1). As history makes clear, the effort failed. But it did provide the Nazis with the
resources to support their chain of subversive agents in Britain.
The current concern with counterfeiting raises a number of issues.  Does the recent atten-
tion reﬂect changes in the signiﬁcance of counterfeiting? What cost does counterfeiting
impose on the economy? How important are counterfeits relative to our overall currency
supply? What challenges does counterfeiting pose for policy-makers?
This paper seeks to redress the lack of attention given by economists to this issue by con-
sidering the economic issues raised by counterfeiting. To do so, an innovative method for
estimating the quantity of counterfeit currency in circulation is proposed,  and estimates
are developed for Canada for 2001. This measure is vital for public policy with respect to
counterfeiting. For individuals and businesses, the share of counterfeits in outstanding cur-
rency indicates the likelihood of receiving a counterfeit note. For government, it measures
the extent to which the circulation of counterfeits displaces legitimate currency and
reduces its seigniorage beneﬁt from the right to issue currency.  Most signiﬁcantly, it
allows monetary authorities to gauge the degree to which counterfeiting challenges the
integrity of the nation’s currency.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the changes in technology that have
increased the threat of counterfeiting; section 3 examines the economic costs of counter-
feiting to society; section 4 discusses the usefulness of different measures of counterfeit-
ing; and section 5 compares different methods for estimating counterfeit currency in
circulation. Estimates of the current extent of counterfeiting of Canadian currency are dis-
cussed in section 6.
2. New Challenges from Counterfeiting
The history of counterfeiting is as old as money itself, and its evolution has followed that
of money. The ﬁrst commodity monies, such as gold and silver coins, tempted counterfeit-
ers to ﬁnd cheaper materials to replace those being used.  The development of paper
money made counterfeiting even more attractive by lowering the production costs to a
fraction of the value in exchange. But not all changes in the evolution of money have
encouraged counterfeiting. Some, such as the move away from many private currencies to
one national currency, discouraged counterfeiting because the larger scale of production
justiﬁed greater investment in security features.3 The move to a national currency also
meant that the public would need to be familiar with the features of only one currency
issue to protect themselves from counterfeits.
For most of the twentieth century, counterfeiting was limited by the large investment
needed for the engraved plates and offset presses required to produce copies of currency
credible enough to be accepted. The introduction of sophisticated colour photocopiers and
ink-jet printers in the early 1990s dramatically changed the technology of counterfeiting,
and sharply lowered the costs.
Changing technology has also altered both the organization of counterfeiting and its vul-
nerability to detection. Offset printing required bulky equipment that was difﬁcult to hide.
Moreover, counterfeits were produced in substantial runs and stored before being placed
3. The exploits of the Johnson gang in the 1880s illustrate the limited investment in security by
some private issuers of bank notes. Speer recounts that the Johnson forgeries could be distin-
guished from authentic notes because they were “too perfect” and lacked the engraving
ﬂaws present in authentic notes (Speer 1904).4
into circulation. Together, these features exposed counterfeiting operations to raids by
enforcement authorities. With new ink-jet and photocopy techniques, counterfeits can be
produced on demand, and thus no inventories are needed.
The effects of these technological changes have been reﬂected in a substantial increase in
the value and volume of counterfeit recoveries shown in Table 2. The level of counterfeit
recoveries has increased from 73,279 in 1993 to 137,045 in 2001. Changing technology
has also been reﬂected in the patterns of recoveries. By 2000, photocopies and ink-jet-
printed notes accounted for 98 per cent of all counterfeits detected.
The new technologies have also altered the way in which counterfeits are detected: there
has been a marked shift in the pattern of detections away from uncirculated counterfeits
towards counterfeits in circulation. As Table 2 shows, the share of counterfeits detected in
circulation has increased steadily from 74 per cent in 1993 to 94 per cent in 2001.
3. The Economic Cost of Counterfeiting
Counterfeiting results in different types of costs:
• coststocurrencyholders
• costs to other users of currency
• revenue costs to the government
Each of these must be considered when examining the overall costs of counterfeiting to
the economy.
3.1 Costs to currency holders
3.1.1 Losses from detection
The person who ﬁrst accepts a counterfeit note from the forger is not necessarily the one
who bears the loss. The real victim is the person who is holding the note when it is
detected. This person exchanged goods and services for the note expecting that the note
could be exchanged later for other goods and services. Victims of counterfeiting lose
because they gave up goods and services and received nothing in return. This type of cost5
from counterfeiting reached $6 million in 2001. These losses can be compared with the
$142 million in credit card losses in the same year.4 Economists note that these are so-
called redistributive costs and are not a cost to the economy overall. The losses suffered by
the public are matched by the gains of the counterfeiters.
3.1.2 Costs of prevention
Prevention costs for counterfeiting include public costs such as spending for police, the
courts, and the prison system. They also include the costs borne by individuals and enter-
prises to protect themselves from counterfeiting. The prevention of other types of theft
consists of locks and security systems, but counterfeit prevention involves training cash
handlers to detect counterfeits and investing in counterfeit detectors. Unlike redistributive
costs, prevention costs represent a loss to society as a whole: resources are directed from
other uses to the prevention of counterfeiting. Moreover, these costs are likely to be a mul-
tiple of the direct losses suffered from counterfeiting if the public’s response is similar to
that for other crimes. Brantingham and Easton (1998) estimate that total costs to Canadi-
ans from property crimes in 1996 were $11.5 billion when prevention costs are taken into
account, an amount 2.5 times the direct cost of property crimes.
Counterfeit prevention has an additional  cost—the expense incurred by the Bank of Can-
ada to provide a secure currency. This includes the added cost of incorporating security
devices in currency issues (i.e., bank notes are more expensive than they would be in the
absence of counterfeiting), together with the costs of designing new note series, which
must be issued more frequently in face of the threat of counterfeiting.
In the absence of counterfeiting, the Bank would face “normal” expenses for issuing cur-
rency.  The above-normal expenses caused by counterfeiting are incurred for all the cur-
rency that the Bank of Canada issues. If extra security features were added as a result of
4. Source: The Canadian Bankers Association, Fast Stats. Although credit cards may be used
for more transactions than currency, the losses on credit cards were 22 times the losses from
counterfeiting. The $36 billion currency stock would need to turn over only 3 1/2 times a
year to carry out the same value of transactions as credit cards. Nevertheless, the losses from
counterfeits may be more apparent because they are borne by the retailers who are stuck
with the worthless notes. Losses from credit cards are usually passed on by ﬁnancial institu-
tions in banking fees rather than charged directly against victimized retailers or cardholders.6
the current levels of counterfeiting (129,000 notes detected in 2001), they would be
required on all outstanding notes of the same denomination.  The addition of a security
device with a cost of two cents per note would eventually require a continuing expenditure
of $6 million per year to incorporate the device in replacement notes for those retired
because of wear. The cost would increase substantially with a more rapid introduction of
the device, because new notes would be needed to replace existing currency that was not
worn out.
3.2 Costs to other users of currency
3.2.1 Inﬂation costs
The price level of any economy is determined partly by the amount of money “chasing”
the supply of goods. As long as it is undetected, counterfeit money has the same effect on
prices as authentic currency: it raises the price level. This reduces the purchasing power of
legitimate money, causing losses to its holders because their money buys less. This effect
will be small because currency is only a small part of the money supply, and changes in its
quantity are unlikely to signiﬁcantly affect the price level. Indeed, the effect will not be
present in countries that pursue inﬂation targeting. In these cases, the inﬂationary impact
of counterfeit currency is offset by a reduced issue of authentic currency.
3.2.2 Costs from reduced use of currency
Currency is useful only as long as people have conﬁdence in its value in transactions.  It
may be surprising to learn that the Bank of Canada and other central banks are not pledged
to convert currency into some form of backing, such as gold. The currency part of our pay-
ments system works because people give up valuable goods and services for “coloured
pieces of paper” (bank notes) because they believe that they, in turn, can use these pieces
of paper to obtain goods and services. Conﬁdence could be lost in a speciﬁc denomination
or in the currency as a whole if people feared counterfeiting to a sufﬁcient degree.
Losing conﬁdence in a speciﬁc denomination would not be as costly as losing conﬁdence
in the entire currency, because people could switch to notes of other denominations. For
example, people could use $20s and $50s if conﬁdence in $100 notes were lost. Neverthe-7
less, a cost remains, because each denomination is particularly suited to speciﬁc types of
transactions. For example, $5 notes are not convenient to pay for intercity air travel,
whereas $100 notes are not useful for purchasing newspapers. In fact, the pattern of out-
standing currency largely reﬂects the suitability of different denominations for particular
transactions.5
A shift away from a particular denomination would also impose costs on the Bank of Can-
ada as currency issuer. Because the Bank meets the public’s demand for speciﬁc denomi-
nations, notes of the threatened denomination would be returned to the Bank prematurely
and replaced with notes of other denominations. To the extent that the threatened notes
are replaced by those of a lower denomination, the Bank’s costs would rise. If, for exam-
ple, people choose to use $20 notes rather than $100 notes, the Bank will have to produce
ﬁve times as many notes to meet the public’s need for currency.6
Recent experience with the $100 note suggests that even low levels of counterfeiting can
threaten the acceptance of a speciﬁc denomination. During 2001, just 46,649 counterfeit
$100 notes were detected relative to an outstanding stock of just over 160 million notes.
Thus, fewer than three counterfeits were detected for each 10,000 authentic $100 notes in
circulation. Even this low level of counterfeiting provoked as many as 15 per cent of mer-
chants in some areas to refuse to accept $100 bills.
It is difﬁcult to estimate the cost to an individual when a particular denomination is
refused. But the loss of conﬁdence in one denomination may spread to others, particularly
when the security features are the same. The costs will then be more signiﬁcant. In the
extreme, the loss of conﬁdence from a high level of counterfeiting may cause people to
stop using currency and turn to other means of payment (barter, foreign currencies,
cheques, credit or debit cards, etc.) that are more expensive or less convenient to use for
particular transactions. Those who do not switch initially suffer because they have fewer
5. See Tschoegl (1997) for a discussion and references to the literature.
6. Similarly, the costs to the Bank would rise if a note that is more expensive to produce
replaced the threatened bill.8
partners with whom they can use currency and, as a result, they will be more likely to
switch.7If this continues, the currency will eventually become useless.8
Perception, as distinct from reality, can be important in determining whether a currency
retains the public’s conﬁdence. The fact that some retailers refuse to accept a particular
denomination has a demonstration effect. Other retailers, even if they have no experience
with counterfeits themselves, may choose to refuse this denomination. In addition, cus-
tomers may choose not to use that denomination, not because they fear counterfeits, but
because they fear that the notes will not be accepted when they want to make purchases.
There is limited experience with respect to the point at which conﬁdence in a currency is
lost, especially under current conditions when the threat from inexpensive technologies,
such as sophisticated photocopiers, is so new. Experience with inﬂation suggests that cur-
rency is so useful that people continue to use it even when inﬂation imposes high costs.
The parallel between inﬂation and counterfeiting is not exact, however. The costs of inﬂa-
tion are spread across all holders of currency (and other forms of money), whereas the
costs of counterfeiting tend to be disproportionately concentrated on merchants, especially
fast-food outlets and convenience stores, where currency is the predominant type of pay-
ment.
It is difﬁcult to estimate the costs to society as a whole from the loss of a national currency
for making payments. Such a loss would affect everyone in the economy in terms of the
time and effort, together with extra monetary costs, needed to make payments by other
means. In this case, even a small cost per person has substantial consequences, given that
virtually everyone uses currency.
The extreme case of a loss of conﬁdence in all the notes of a particular issue of a country’s
7.  Currency is what economists describe as a network utility in that each user’s beneﬁt
depends on the number of other users with whom exchange is possible.
8. Nosal and Wallace (2001) develop a model that suggests that counterfeiting may preclude
the possibility of a monetary equilibrium. This result conﬁrms that counterfeiting is a seri-
ous threat that warrants substantial preventive action, even though its occurrence in practice
may be low.9
currency, although unlikely, would require its replacement. One possibility is that the
domestic currency is replaced by a foreign currency. Even if this could be an orderly
process at the hand-to-hand currency level, costly adjustments would be required in the
restatement of the accounts of ﬁnancial institutions and other ﬁnancial contracts into the
substitute currency. Alternatively, the domestic currency could be replaced by other meth-
ods of payment, such as cheques and debit cards. In this case, the costs would be less,
since the currency could still be used as the unit of account. Progress in the adoption and
development of alternative payment technologies, such as debit cards, may alleviate the
consequences of reduced conﬁdence in a currency.
3.3 Revenue costs to the government
Governments receive revenue from the circulation of currency. In Canada, the central bank
holds government securities against its outstanding issue of currency and, in 2001,
received $2.1 billion in interest revenue from these securities. A small part of these reve-
nues is used to ﬁnance the Bank of Canada’s operations, and the remainder is transferred
to the Government of Canada each year. This revenue would shrink to the extent that peo-
ple reduced their use of currency.
4. Dimensions of Counterfeiting
Various measures of counterfeiting can provide different perspectives for public policy.
These measures include
• the ﬂow of counterfeits detected over time,
• the rate at which counterfeits are detected in Bank of Canada processing,
• the stock of circulating counterfeits, and
• the introduction of counterfeits into circulation.
As shown in Table 3, each measure also has a different signiﬁcance and availability.10
4.1 Counterfeits detected
The number and value of counterfeits detected by denomination over any period are pub-
lished monthly in the Bank of Canada Banking and Financial Statistics, a degree of dis-
closure that appears to be unique. The detection data have economic signiﬁcance in that
they indicate those losses realized by the public through the acceptance of counterfeit cur-
rency. But these costs are only a part of the economic cost of counterfeiting. This measure
also provides an indication of the level of counterfeiting activity, albeit with an uncertain
lag.
Despite any intuition to the contrary, the volume of detections over a period (a ﬂow), will
not be a good measure of outstanding counterfeits (a stock). As Table 4 shows, the same
level of detection can be consistent with a large circulating stock with few detected over a
period, or a small stock with a higher proportion detected.
4.2 Rate of detection in processing
The proportion of counterfeits—“parts per million”—measure of counterfeiting is deter-
mined during processing by the currency issuer. This could provide an accurate measure
of the share of counterfeits in the stock of outstanding currency if all false notes were
detected through processing. But this is not the case. Notes received for processing may
have already been “handled” by others, such as retail cashiers, bank tellers, and the back-
ofﬁce employees at commercial banks, all of whom detect a share of the counterfeits.
The detection of counterfeits by the public rather than by the central bank is not the only
problem with this measure of counterfeiting activity. Movements in this measure can take
place for different reasons. Certainly, an increase in counterfeiting activity will soon be
reﬂected in an elevated level of counterfeits detected during currency processing. But the
proportion of counterfeits detected by the Bank also depends on the frequency with which
currency is processed. For example, if currency is processed once a year on average, the
Bank will detect those counterfeits placed into circulation over the past year that have not
been discovered by the private sector. If processing occurs only once every two years, the
share of counterfeits in the notes processed would be expected to be larger if11
counterfeiting activity remained unchanged. It is important to recognize that a higher pro-
portion of counterfeits in notes processed need not reﬂect a higher level of counterfeiting
activity if the frequency of processing has changed. The decreased frequency of currency
processing by the Bank of Canada since 1997 has been one factor contributing to a higher
proportion of counterfeits detected during processing. It has also resulted in a higher vol-
ume of counterfeits in circulation (in the absence of any change in counterfeiting activity),
because one source of detection has become less intensive.
4.3 Stock of circulating counterfeits
The circulating stock of counterfeit currency indicates the potential cost arising from a
systemic threat to a currency. Unlike detections, the circulating stock imposes no costs on
the public other than its impact on the purchasing power of legitimate currency or the loss
of seigniorage to the currency issuer. Other than these relatively minor effects, it might be
questioned whether undetected counterfeits impose costs. Can what people and the money
issuer don’t know hurt them? Any costs of undetected counterfeits are potential costs. But
the hidden nature of undetected counterfeits could change quickly if a simple, cheap
device could be discovered, possibly by accident, that could detect counterfeit notes.9
Conﬁdence in a particular denomination or a currency issue could be jeopardized if the
stock of outstanding counterfeits were found to be large. Unlike the previous two meas-
ures, the stock of circulating counterfeits cannot be measured directly.
Thestockofcounterfeitsoutstandingatanytimewillbetheresultof severalfactors—the
the level of counterfeits introduced into the system, as well as the length of time that they
circulate, which depends partly on the frequency of the central bank’s currency process-
ing.
9. Tom Ferguson, Director of the U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing, related how a simple
protein detector was able to distinguish genuine U.S. currency from counterfeits. The detec-
tor left yellow marks on genuine bills because of their protein content. Not surprisingly,
counterfeiters quickly countered by placing yellow marks on their notes to suggest that they
had already passed the test. Still, this device altered the technology of counterfeit detection
in a short period of time and revealed the extent of one type of counterfeiting (Ferguson
2002).12
4.4 Introduction of new counterfeits
A measure of the introduction of new counterfeits into circulation would, if it existed, pro-
vide a valuable indicator of the future threat to the currency. While this measure is
unknown at any time, some indicators may be available.  Data with respect to police sei-
zures of undistributed counterfeits provide some indication of current counterfeiting activ-
ity. This measure also depends on the resources committed to detection by the police and,
in the short run, would be subject to ﬂuctuations. This measure is less useful than in the
past because changing technology has reduced the need for inventories of unissued coun-
terfeits. The efﬁcient use of offset techniques created runs of currency in excess of
amounts that could be distributed immediately. Ink-jet printers and photocopiers do not
have the same set-up costs and provide a more even ﬂow of bogus notes.
5. Method of Estimation
The current stock of circulating counterfeits indicates the level of risk to the integrity of
the currency and is a vital input for public policy regarding counterfeiting. Still, there is
much uncertainty about the actual level of counterfeiting, and this leads to rumour and
speculation. The Economist (2001) cites one forensic analyst who claims that as much as
2 to 3 per cent of the former euro-currencies and 30 per cent of U.S. dollars circulating in
Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and elsewhere may be counterfeit. These levels for U.S.
dollars contrast markedly with reports from the U.S. Secret Service that only $47 million
in counterfeit notes was detected in the United States during 2001.10 They are also incon-
sistent with the latest report by the U.S. Treasury Department (March 2003), which esti-
mates the proportion of counterfeits in U.S currency outstanding as 1 in 10,000 notes
worldwide.
In a rare attempt to measure the stock of circulating counterfeits, the U.S. Treasury used
two approaches: the “parts-found-in-processing (PFP)” method and “the life-of-counter-
feits (LOC)” method. The simplest PFP approach extrapolates the number of counterfeits
10. See also Judson and Porter (2003), who deal directly with the circulation of counterfeits out-
side the United States.13
per million found by the monetary authorities during currency processing to the entire
stock of currency. PFP’ extends the approach to reﬂect the discovery of counterfeits out-
side the authorities’ processing activities. In contrast, the LOC method extrapolates the
ﬂow of discovered counterfeits to the stock using estimates of the life of counterfeits in
circulation.
In this section, these alternative approaches are reviewed and assessed. An alternative
composite (COMP) approach is also proposed that overcomes some of the limitations of
the PFP and LOC methods. Table 5 shows the data that form the basis for the different
estimates.
5.1 Parts-found-in-processing approach
The simplest PFP approach estimates the number of circulating counterfeits of any
denomination, CN, as
CN = BOCPPM•NICN ,
where BOCPPM is the number of counterfeit notes detected per million notes processed
by the central bank and NICN is the outstanding stock of notes of denomination N.
The PFP approach would measure the stock of counterfeits accurately if (i) detected coun-
terfeits were found only during the central bank’s processing activities, and (ii) the notes
processed by the bank were representative of outstanding currency with respect to the
share of counterfeits. In this case, the bank’s detection rate for each denomination could be
extrapolated to the stock of notes of that denomination to give an estimate of circulating
counterfeits. Such estimates are presented in part A of Table 6.
One shortcoming of the PFP method is that it treats all counterfeits as if they were
detected during processing by the monetary authority. As the U.S. Treasury recognizes,
the conditions necessary for this simple extrapolation do not hold. The data on counterfeit
recoveries in Canada (Table 2) show that recoveries by the general public have been sub-
stantial. Overall, the Bank of Canada accounted for only 21.5 per cent of total counterfeit
detections in 2001, with the remainder made by the general public—individuals,14
businesses, and ﬁnancial institutions. The central bank’s share of detections ranged from a
high of 31.5 per cent for $10 notes (processed, on average, once a year) to a low of 10.4
per cent for $100 notes (processed, on average, once every 10 years). The private sector’s
contribution to the detection of a substantial share of the counterfeits recovered from cir-
culation means that any estimates must reﬂect recoveries by both the public and the mone-
tary authority.11
The U.S. Treasury has adapted the PFP approach to take into account detections made in
the private sector. The adapted version of PFP (PFP’) adds the proportion of counterfeits
detected by the public to the proportion detected during processing by the monetary
authority:
CN = BOCPPM• s • NICN,
where s is the ratio of total detections to detections made by the central bank.12These esti-
mates are shown in part B of Table 6.
Unfortunately, the adjustment used in the PFP’ approach does not take into account the
difference between the rate of currency turnover in the public’s transactions and the rate at
which it is processed. Therefore, the adjustment would be appropriate only if the monetary
authority processed all currency each time it turned over in private sector transactions.13
These two PFP approaches, as the U.S.Treasury recognizes, set limits on the estimates by
effectively bracketing the stock of circulating counterfeit notes. The PFP approach repre-
sents a lower-bound estimate because it does not include the counterfeits detected outside
11. The Bank of Canada has recognized the importance of public detection, and this is reﬂected
in its growing currency-education program.
12. More precisely, the ratio s = TDN/BDN = (PDN + BDN)/BDN,
where TDN represents total detections of counterfeit notes of denomination N; PDN, detec-
tions of denomination N made by the public; and BDN, detections of denomination N made
by the central bank in processing. TD, PD, and BD are all measured as number of detections
per year.
13. This assumption would imply the following rates of turnover: $5—once a year, $1—once
every 10 months, $20—once every 8 months, $50—once every 5 years, and $100— once
every 10 years.15
the central bank. The PFP’ approach represents a useful upper-bound estimate because it
is based on the implausible assumption about the turnover of currency in private transac-
tions.
5.2 Life-of-counterfeit approach
The U.S. Treasury also estimates the stock of circulating counterfeits using the “life-of-
counterfeit” (LOC) method. This method extrapolates the ﬂow of discovered counterfeits
to the total stock by using the estimated life of counterfeits. With this approach, the
number of circulating counterfeits of denomination N is
CN = LOCN •TDN,
where LOCN represents the life of counterfeits, and TDNis the annual recovery of counter-
feits of denomination N. The shortcomings of the LOC approach are more practical than
those of the PFP approach: data on the circulating life of counterfeits are meagre. Esti-
mates derived from the LOC method, based on data on the life of counterfeit $100 notes,
and then extrapolated to other denominations on the basis of the lives in circulation of
authentic notes, are presented in part C of Table 6.
5.3 The composite method
The proposed composite method (COMP) combines elements of both PFP and LOC to
estimate the stock of circulating counterfeits. It draws on the LOC approach by using rare
data on the life of a particular run of $100 counterfeits to provide a basis for estimating the
lifespan of counterfeit $100 notes. It then uses PFP, together with data on the public’s
detection of counterfeits, to anchor estimates of the counterfeit stock on assumptions
about the public’s efﬁciency in detecting counterfeits. The COMP method uses more data
for its estimates than either the LOC and PFP approaches. These data include information
about the life of counterfeits, the rate at which counterfeits are detected by the monetary
authority during processing, and the annual ﬂow of counterfeits detected outside the mon-
etary authority.
This approach explicitly recognizes that screening for counterfeits takes place both inside16
and outside the Bank of Canada. The public and ﬁnancial institutions, in their transactions
and processing of currency, are the sources of screening outside the monetary authority.
The efﬁciency of screening when currency is transferred among individuals, businesses,
and ﬁnancial institutions indicates the proportion of counterfeits that originally existed in
the batches of currency before they were sent to the central bank.
The COMP method estimates the stock of outstanding counterfeits using three separate
elements.
(i) The ﬁrst element expresses the relation between the stock of outstanding coun-
terfeits, C, of any denomination, N, and detections of counterfeits of that denomination,
given the assumed efﬁciency of public screening, e, and the proportion of counterfeiting
detected by the central bank, BOCPPM:
C(e)N = PPM • NICN = BOCPPM • NICN / (1 –e). 14 (1)
This relation states that any batch of currency in circulation has a proportion PPM of
counterfeits. Any batch of currency processed by the central bank ﬁrst turns over in a pri-
vate sector transaction, where e of the counterfeits are detected before it is passed to the
central bank, where the remaining counterfeit notes are detected. It builds on the PFP
method by allowing for different efﬁciencies of public detection.15 The extreme values of
0 and 1 for e are ruled out because the possibility that the public is unable to detect coun-
terfeits contradicts the data showing that they do, and the possibility of a value of 1 contra-
dicts the fact that some counterfeits are still found in the batches of currency that reach the
Bank of Canada.
(ii) The second element deals with the turnover of currency needed to account for
the actual level of public detection of counterfeits during a year, given the efﬁciency of
public screening. It relates the estimated turnover, T, of counterfeits of denomination N to
14. If PPM is the original proportion of counterfeits in circulating currency, then the proportion
detected by the central bank BOCPPM = (1–e)PPM.
15. Equation (1) would be equivalent to the PFP method when e=0, and to the PFP’ method
when e = PD/TD.17
the efﬁciency of public screening:
T(e)N = PDN/ePPM • NICN , (2)
where the denominator measures public detections per turnover of the circulating stock of
denomination N. From equation (2), e can be expressed as a function of turnover:
e = PDN /(T(e)NPPM • NICN). (2a)
(iii) The third element relates LOCN, the estimated life of counterfeit notes of
denomination N to the stock of counterfeits of that denomination, CN , and to the annual
ﬂow of detections, TDN:
LOCN = C(e)N/TDN. (3)
 Equation (3) is a rearrangement of the basic LOC equation.
Data are readily available for BOCPPM in equation (1); all NICNin equations (1) and (2);
and for all T(e)N in equation (2). Each equation, however, requires information on
unknowns in order to estimate C(e)N. These unknowns are e in equations (1) and (2); TN in
equation (2); and LOCN in equation (3). Values for TN and LOCN could be derived using
knowledge about the turnover rate of the currency or the life of counterfeits. In both cases,
however, information is limited.
Estimates of the turnover rate of currency are few and are of questionable reliability. A
survey conducted by the U.S. Treasury suggested that currency turns over about 40 times
per year (U.S. Treasury 2000, 96). Households responding to the same survey reported
holding only $100 in currency compared with the Treasury’s estimate of $575 per house-
hold. In addition, as the Treasury pointed out, this turnover rate, together with the esti-
mated $575 currency per capita, would ﬁnance $23,000 per year in expenditures, almost
$2,000 more than the level reported in the survey. Based on survey responses indicating
that households used currency in only 20 per cent of their transactions, the Treasury sug-
gested that the turnover rate of currency is likely to be nearer to 8 times per year. While
this rate may seem low, it is consistent with a large proportion of currency used as a store
of value with a low velocity, or with a large portion of currency held by businesses and18
used in intermediate, as well as ﬁnal, purchases.
The composite method overcomes the limitations of the data by estimating the life of
counterfeits needed in equation (3) using a unique set of data collected by the Bank of
Canada and Canadian law-enforcement authorities. Speciﬁcally, the recoveries of a series
of high-quality counterfeit $100 notes circulating in the late 1990s are used to estimate the
life of counterfeits. As shown in Chart 1, these recoveries peaked in mid-1998 about the
time that the counterfeiters responsible for the series were taken into custody, and declined
steadily thereafter. The pattern is consistent with the gradual running down of a ﬁxed stock
of counterfeit notes that reached a maximum near the time of the arrests.
The average life of this series of counterfeits was estimated using the recovery data shown
in Chart 1. The rate of decay of the stock of counterfeits was derived as follows. The stock
of counterfeits at any time t periods after the series ceased to be introduced, Ct, can be rep-
resented as
Ct = Coe-dt ,                        (4)
where Co is the stock at the time new counterfeits ceased to be introduced, and d is the rate
of decay of the counterfeit stock. But since the rate of decay, rt= d Ct,
r t = r0e-dt.
Thus, the decay rate of circulating counterfeits can be estimated by the equation
lnrt = lnr0- dt .
Estimates of this equation for the series of counterfeit $100 notes over various periods,
starting around the time of the arrest of the counterfeiters and ending in 2002, centred on a
value for d of 0.08 per month, giving an average life of slightly more than 12 months.
When a value of 12 months is substituted for the life of $100 counterfeit notes in equation
(3), an estimate of 48,518 outstanding $100 counterfeits is obtained (part C, Table 6). Fur-
ther substitution into equation (1) yields an efﬁciency of public screening of e = 0.1, which
implies a rate of 303 per million counterfeits among circulating $100 notes and an annual
turnover rate of 6.7 for $100 notes.19
The lack of data on the lifespan of other notes rules out using the same method for estimat-
ing counterfeits of other denominations. Instead, the estimates for the other denominations
use the data in Table 5 with respect to the lifespans of different denominations of currency.
These data, together with the assumption that turnover and currency life are inversely pro-
portional, give estimates of the turnover rates for each denomination. The estimated turno-
ver rates are substituted into equation (2) to give estimates of e for each denomination.
These values for e are then substituted into equation (1) to give estimates of the number of
$5, $10, $20, and $50 counterfeits in circulation in 2001, shown in part D of Table 6.
5.4 Sources of bias
The derivation of the COMP estimates is based on several assumptions:
• the lifespan of the identiﬁed series reﬂects the overall experience with
counterfeit $100 notes
• the relation between the lifespan and turnover rate of notes of different
denominations represents actual experience
• all counterfeits detected in circulation are reported in the Bank of Canada data
• notes processed by the Bank are representative of all notes outstanding in terms
of proportion of counterfeits
• the Bank detects all counterfeits in the batches that it processes
5.4.1 Life of counterfeits
Counterfeit notes differ substantially in quality. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some
counterfeits are so crude that they are detected immediately when passed into circulation.
Others, such as the “supernote” U.S. $100 bill, are of such high quality that they are appar-
ently difﬁcult to detect.16 Allowing for differences in quality would change both the anal-
ysis and the interpretation to be placed on the results.
The assumed lifespan of counterfeit notes, based on the experience with the identiﬁed
$100 counterfeit series, provided the basis for the analysis. This series was not, however, a
16. The U.S. Treasury suggests that the life of “supernotes” may be as long as 3 1/2 years (U.S.
Treasury 2000, 105–6).20
typical counterfeit, either in terms of quality or the quantities placed into circulation. Its
superior quality brought it to the attention of the authorities and led to it being designated
a series. Moreover, it was produced in sufﬁcient numbers that it accounted for 80 per cent
of $100 counterfeits detected during 1999. Thus, it is likely that notes of this series
remained in circulation longer than other, lower-quality counterfeits.
As discussed above, it is not possible to be completely sure that the counterfeit stopped
ﬂowing into circulation once production was halted. Consequently, estimates of the
lifespan of counterfeits based on the data for the series may be atypically long. Both these
features mean that extrapolations based on the survival of this series of counterfeit $100
notes may, if anything, overstate the estimates for outstanding counterfeits in general.
5.4.2 Turnover
The source of bias with respect to the relationship between turnover rate and currency life
is more subtle. The relationship itself depends on the further assumption that currency
wear depends solely on turnover and is otherwise independent of the time the currency has
been in circulation.17 The assumption that wear depends directly on time in circulation
would lead to the overestimation of the turnover of other denominations if part of the wear
of $100 bills were a function of their time in circulation and not their turnover. On the
other hand, if people took greater care of higher-denomination notes so that their wear was
lower relative to their turnover, the proportional relationship would underestimate the
turnover of lower-denomination notes.
The estimated efﬁciency of public screening depends inversely on the estimated turnover,
and the estimated counterfeits in circulation depend, in turn, directly on the efﬁciency of
public screening. Thus, underestimates of turnover lead to higher estimates, and overesti-
mates of turnover lead to lower estimates of circulating counterfeits. The effects of this
bias on the estimates are then ambiguous: neither the size nor the direction of the bias can
17. Turnover refers to the number of times a note is transferred in making transactions. The life
of a note refers to the time between a note being placed into circulation and the time that it
leaves circulation. They are related in that notes with high turnover wear out more quickly,
and, as a result, have a shorter life. The relationship is not perfect, however, because notes
may be withdrawn before they are worn out.21
be determined. Sensitivity tests, however, suggest that even substantial differences in turn-
over at values close to those estimated would not materially affect the estimates of circu-
lating counterfeits.18
5.4.3 Reporting
The analysis also assumes that all counterfeit detections are included in Bank of Canada
data; i.e., that in addition to detections by the Bank, they include those reported to the
police by individuals and businesses. It is this last group that raises a possibility of bias. It
is difﬁcult to judge the extent to which victims of counterfeits report their discoveries.
Many recipients of counterfeit $5 and $10 notes would just accept their losses. Most of the
threat from counterfeiting, however, comes from higher denominations that tend to be of
better quality and that are often detected when businesses process their cash or make
deposits at banks. Counterfeits detected at these stages are more likely to be reported since
businesses have an interest in preventing counterfeiting.
Under-reporting of counterfeits affects the estimation procedure in several ways. The time
pattern of the recoveries of the identiﬁed series plays a role in the choice among alterna-
tive scenarios for the $100 note through matching the life of counterfeits implied in differ-
ent scenarios with its average life. Constant under-reporting of the identiﬁed series would
not, however, affect this rate of decay, since each reported recovery level would be a ﬁxed
fraction of actual recoveries.
5.4.4 Nature of screened notes
The Bank of Canada typically screens notes under two circumstances: (i) when ﬁnancial
institutions judge the notes to be worn and (ii) when a ﬁnancial institution has notes in
excess of its needs and the amount of non-circulating notes that it can store under its
agreement with the Bank of Canada (Bilkes 1997). If these were the sole reasons for the
Bank to process notes, the reported detection rates would be typical of the currency
received by the Bank from ﬁnancial institutions. Occasionally, however, the Bank recalls
and processes currency from particular regions where it believes the incidence of counter-
18. For example, raising the assumed turnover of $20 bills by 10 per cent would raise the esti-
mate of outstanding counterfeits by just 0.8 per cent.22
feiting may be unusually high. If this assumption is correct, to the extent that the Bank
processes currency on this basis, the Bank’s reported detection rates would be higher than
those for normal processing. This would also cause the estimates of circulating counter-
feits to be biased upwards. The use of targeted processing is quite recent and was small
relative to total processing in 2001. So, it would not likely be a signiﬁcant source of bias
over the year.
5.4.5 The Bank of Canada’s detection rate
The estimates treat the detection rate reported by the Bank of Canada as a benchmark for
complete detection and, in effect, assume that the Bank has a perfect ability to detect the
counterfeits among the notes that it processes. As a result, the estimates of fake notes in
circulation will be biased downwards if the Bank cannot detect all the counterfeits in the
batches that it processes. This source of bias is probably small, or non-existent, since the
Bank uses undisclosed security features in its detection process.19
5.4.6 Overall bias
The resulting estimates of circulating counterfeits are thus conditional on the sources of
bias. All but one of the identiﬁed biases result in conservative estimates, in that they over-
state the number of counterfeit notes in circulation. Although the remaining bias is ambig-
uous, its effects are likely to be small.
6. The Number and Value of Counterfeit Notes in Circulation
Table 7 provides estimates of the number of counterfeits in circulation for each denomina-
tion. As discussed above, the two PFP methods provide ﬂoor and ceiling estimates. As can
be seen, the differences between the two methods are substantial: the PFP’ estimate is
more than nine times the PFP estimate for the $100 note. When the COMP results are
compared with the basic LOC and PFP results, there is uniformity with respect to these
estimates. This uniformity is remarkable in that the LOC and PFP methods do not share
19. The U.S. Treasury also makes this assumption in developing its estimates. Allison and Pian-
alto (1997) concede, however, that the Federal Reserve detects only “virtually all counterfeit
notes,” not all counterfeits, in the notes it processes.23
common data. The results of both the LOC and the COMP approach are both close to
those of the minimal PFP approach that is based on the assumption that no detections take
place outside the monetary authority. This result for COMP may appear to conﬂict with
the observation that the majority of counterfeit detections are made by the general public.
The seeming inconsistency is explained by the fact that public detections appear to be the
product of a low efﬁciency of public screening combined with a high rate of currency turn-
over.
The COMP approach produces some interesting by-products. It suggests that the detection
rate by the public per turnover of currency is from 6 per cent to 13 per cent as effective as
screening by the central bank (Table 6). The COMP approach also provides estimates of
turnover rates for currency in circulation, ranging from a low of 6.7 times per year for
$100 notes to 33.0 times for $10 notes. The calculated life of counterfeits ranges from ﬁve
months for $5 notes to one year for $100 notes.
The richness of results of the COMP approach reﬂects the considerably greater use of data
than for either the LOC or the PFP approach. The analysis does show that both the LOC
and PFP approaches are good approximations for the COMP method. In particular, the
PFP approach uses data that are readily available to the monetary authority through its
normal operations. While the data for the COMP approach are less likely to be readily
available, the effort to collect these data would allow the use of the COMP method as a
cross-check on the continuing suitability of the PFP approach as a ready indicator of the
extent of counterfeiting.
The COMP method provides a preferred estimate of circulating counterfeits because it
combines features of both the PFP and LOC approaches to overcome their shortcomings.
The COMP method suggests that approximately 84,047 counterfeit notes with a value of
$5.5 million were circulating in Canada during 2001. It also indicates that, on average,
counterfeit notes circulate undetected for a period between 5 months for $5 and $10 notes
to 12 months for $100 notes. The estimated stock of circulating counterfeit notes is
approximately 63 per cent of the number of notes detected over the year. This difference24
can be accounted for by the fact that no denomination remains in circulation for more than
a year.
For the general public, the real concern is the chance of getting a counterfeit note when
they make a transaction. If, as the COMP estimates suggest, $5.5 million worth of counter-
feit notes circulate among the $36 billion worth of authentic currency outstanding, the
chance of getting a counterfeit had a value of $0.014 per $1,000 of transactions in 2001.20
How credible are these estimates? Unfortunately, the inability to observe the counterfeits
in circulation rules out a deﬁnitive answer. Nevertheless, there is some indirect evidence.
The estimates show that in 2001 the problem of circulating counterfeits was primarily an
issue for the high-denomination notes. This ﬁnding is consistent with what would be
expected, given the counterfeiters’ incentives and the small differences in the production
costs of different denominations. The implied rates of detection by denomination are also
suggestive. There appear to be substantial differences in the public’s effectiveness in
screening different denominations. For example, the public appears much more effective
at screening high-denomination notes. This ﬁnding also appears consistent with expecta-
tions. There is a greater incentive to devote effort to screening $100 notes than $5 and $10
notes.
7. Conclusions
This study has examined different aspects of the problem of counterfeiting in Canada. In
doing so, it has developed and used an innovative technique for estimating counterfeit cur-
rency in circulation that combines elements of previous approaches and provides estimates
for 2001. On this basis, the following conclusions can be made with respect to the counter-
feiting of Canadian currency:
• over the past decade, technological developments have increased the threat to
currency from counterfeiting
• the threat of impaired conﬁdence in currency issues, and currency generally,
20. This assumes that counterfeit notes turn over at the same rate as authentic notes of the same
denomination.25
can be compounded by public perceptions that may not be based on actual
experience
• even with recent higher levels of counterfeiting activity, bogus notes still
accounted for no more than than 0.01 per cent of the notes in circulation during
2001, or fewer than one counterfeit note for every 290 Canadians
• the value of outstanding counterfeit notes was approximately $5.5 million, or
19 cents per person, in 2001
• the incidence of counterfeiting in 2001 was predominantly a problem of $100
notes
Further research is needed into how different security features used in currency design can
deter counterfeiters. Unfortunately, few central banks release statistics regarding the
counterfeiting of their currency.21The most readily available data are likely to be detec-
tions or rates of detection in central bank processing, neither of which measures the vol-
ume of counterfeits in circulation—the best indicator of the degree to which a currency’s
security features have deterred counterfeiters.
There would be substantial beneﬁts from applying the procedure presented here to derive
comparable estimates for other countries. Currency operations elsewhere vary substan-
tially in many dimensions, including currency design, printing techniques, security fea-
tures, and the substrate on which currency is printed. Knowledge of the various
international counterfeiting experiences would provide a basis for evaluating the deterrent
effects of different features and their combination.
The probability that counterfeit notes accounted for only approximately 0.008 per cent of
the currency in circulation in 2001 should not be grounds for complacency: the technology
available to counterfeiters continues to advance at a rapid pace.
Public policy towards counterfeiting will be inﬂuenced by an inherent paradox of crime
prevention. The threat of a crime, in some sense, should not be measured by actual crime
rates, but by the rates that would be observed in the absence of prevention. The observed
counterfeiting levels reﬂect the substantial costs for features such as elaborate designs,
21. Germany provided data on annual detections from processing before it adopted the euro.
The United States has made similar data available on an occasional basis.26
security devices, and distinctive paper incurred by the Bank of Canada in its efforts to pre-
vent the illicit duplication of its currency. There are also the private costs borne mainly by
retailers in their efforts to avoid accepting counterfeits, as well as the public costs of edu-
cation, policing, and the administration of justice. Assuring appropriate policy responses
to counterfeiting is vital, because failure to deal with counterfeiting would threaten the
public’s conﬁdence in all or a part of a country’s currency, requiring greater preventive
expenditures by currency issuers and users. Law-enforcement agencies and the courts
must reﬂect these realities in dealing with cases of counterfeiting.27
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$5 727 2.2 23.4 145,421 14.5 4.7
$10 948 2.9 30.6 94,813 9.5 3.1
$20 10,094 30.9 325.4 504,705 50.3 16.3
$50 4,869 14.9 157.0 97,382 9.7 3.1
$100 16,016 49.0 516.3 160,156 16.0 5.2
Totala
a. $35,561 million if $1, $2, and $1,000 notes are included for a total of 1,277 million notes outstanding.
32,654 100.0 1,052.6 1,002,478 100.0 32.3
Chart 1
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* Excludes $1 and $2 notes.
a. The remaining notes detected in use were found in Bank of Canada processing.




























1993 73,279 18,978 54,301 74.1 32,149 59.2
1994 109,923 30,739 79,184 72.0 54,871 69.3
1995 55,658 6,325 49,333 88.6 32,264 65.4
1996 86,860 15,986 70,874 81.6 64,914 91.6 33,919 47.9
1997 109,880 14,432 95,448 86.9 92,716 97.1 55,065 57.7
1998 131,123 9,150 121,973 93.0 120,002 98.4 95,906 78.6
1999 111,357 16,706 94,651 85.0 92,645 97.9 75.399 79.7
2000 104,656 10,420 94,236 90.0 92,097 97.7 74,213 78.8
2001 137,045 8,128 128,917 94.1 128,479 99.7 100,121 77.731


















Moderate Measures rate at which central bank
detects counterfeits in its processing.
Changes may indicate trends in outstand-
ing number of counterfeits, frequency of
processing, or efforts to target processing






High Measures both success of counterfeiters





Unknown High Measures current introduction of counter-
feits and indicates potential vulnerability
Table 4: Estimates of Counterfeits in Circulation Based on
Average  Circulation and Rate of Detection: 2001
Average circulation






Annual rate of detection: 129,000 notes32
Source: Bank of Canada, Department of Banking Operations
a. Derived from a designated series of $100 counterfeit notes.
Table 5: Data for Estimating Outstanding Counterfeits: 2001
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 Total Used in
Detection rate per
million by Bank of
Canada




0.67 0.69 0.72 0.85 0.90 0.78 PFP’,
COMP
Annual detections 5,306 40,791 30,839 5,275 46,649 128,860 LOC,
COMP





Life of authentic notes
(months)
23 22 42 73 108 COMP
Outstanding stocks
(million)
145.4 94.8 504.7 97.4 160.2 1,002.5 PFP, PFP’,
COMP33
Table 6: Estimates of Outstanding Counterfeits: 2001




lation 1,900 13,995 13,132 3,808 42,303 75,138
Value of counter-
feits in circula-
tion ($) 9,500 139,950 262,640 190,400 4,230,300 4,832,790
(B) PFP’ method
Adjusted detec-
tion rate 40.1 468.6 93.8 260.5 2532.2
Number of coun-
terfeits in circu-
lation 5,829 44,429 47,345 25,365 405,550 528,518
Value of counter-
feits in circula-
tion ($) 29,145 444,290 946,900 1,268,250 40,555,00 43,243,585
(C) LOC method
Estimated life of
counterfeita 0.22 0.21 0.40 0.70 1.04
Number of coun-
terfeits in circu-
lation 1,175 8,642 12,473 3,708 48,518 74,513
Value of counter-
feits in circula-
tion ($) 5,875 86,420 249,460 185,400 4,851,800 5,378,65534
a. The life derived for the counterfeit $100 note serves as an anchor to calculate the life of counterfeits of
all other denominations by extrapolating from the relative lives of authentic notes.
(D) COMP method
Efﬁciency of
public screening 0.056 0.057 0.089 0.106 0.128
Annual
turnover 31.6 33.0 17.3 10.0 6.7
Life of counter-
feits (years) 0.38 0.36 0.47 0.81 1.04
Number of coun-
terfeits 2,012 14,840 14,421 4,259 48,515 84,047
Value of counter-
feits ($) 10,060 148,400 288,400 212,950 4,851,800 5,511,310
Table 6: Estimates of Outstanding Counterfeits: 2001 (cont’d)
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 Total35
Table 7: Comparison of Estimates: Number and Value
of Counterfeit Notes in Circulation
Method Denomination
$5 $10 $20 $50 $100 Total
Number
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